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After the financial crisis, safe and effective global financial system is 
extremely important. The doctrines of existing international law and 
development of economic theories provide a good theoretical foundation for the 
building of international cooperation system on financial supervision and 
management. However, the different interests and powers from the participants 
in the international cooperation have caused many difficulties. Therefore, to 
establish an effective and practical international cooperation legal system of 
financial regulation, both analysis from the economics and legal aspects are 
needed to improve the system. This paper is divided into four chapters. 
Chapter one mainly discusses whether the present international 
environment and the academic theories could provide a good theoretical 
foundation to the building of the legal system on international financial 
regulatory cooperation 
Chapter Two: Based on the reality, the development of the international 
financial integration results more and more challenges in the international 
financial regulatory cooperation. Moreover, restructuring of the cooperation 
system is especially crucial, due to the defects of existing system. 
Chapter Three focuses on finding out the problems in the international 
financial regulatory cooperation by using Analysis of Law and Economic. The 
comparison of two case studies on international capital market regulation is 
used to identify the main factors of the race to the bottom. Secondly, as a 
collective activity, "free rider" is another problem in the international financial 
regulatory cooperation. This paper will try to find out the keys of the problems 
by using the theory of Game to compare and contrast the interests of both 
parties. Lastly, reasonable distribution policy needs to be taken into account, to 













in regulation cooperation. 
Chapter Four: In the restructuring of the international financial regulatory 
cooperation legal system, the framework of the G20 summit should be firstly 
discussed. Secondly, applying the mechanism of rewards and penalties and the 
accountability system, based on the above analysis. Lastly, according to the 
recent conditions, the establishment of multiple levels of governance 
institutions and crisis defense system are also necessary. 
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第一章  构建金融监管国际合作法律制度的理论基础 
3 


























合作是否具有可能性是一种方法。本文借用 Giovanni Dell'Ariccia 和
Robert Marquez 的“监管中的外部性模型” 和制度经济学理论对此进行分
析。 
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